MEV Explorer

How it works

Fetches one recent block and all of its receipts from a public node and looks for maximal-extractable-value patterns: sandwich attacks on Uniswap V2/V3-style pools (an actor trading right before and after a victim in the same pool), cyclic arbitrage (a transaction whose sender or contract ends with more of a token and less of none), Aave V3 liquidations, the block builder (fee recipient and extraData tag, plus the builder→proposer payment) and a priority-fee ranking.

• Data: eth_getBlockByNumber(n, true) and eth_getBlockReceipts(n) (falls back to one eth_getTransactionReceipt per transaction, max 300).
• Swaps: Uniswap V2 Swap(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address) and V3 Swap(address,address,int256,int256,uint160,uint128,int24) logs (also emitted by the many forks using the same events), converted to pool deltas; direction = which token the pool received.
• Sandwich: in one pool, a front-run and back-run by the same actor (same sender, or the same `to` contract when at most two senders call it in the block — public routers are excluded) in opposite directions, bracketing a victim swap by a different actor in the front-run's direction; the back-run must sell 50–105 % of what the front-run bought. Profit = what the back-run took out minus what the front-run put in, per pool token (before gas and builder tips).
• Cyclic arbitrage: a transaction with swaps in ≥ 2 pools in which the sender or the called contract paid out a token and got more of that same token back, with no token ending negative (from ERC-20 Transfer logs). CoW Protocol settlements (GPv2Settlement) are excluded.
• Liquidations: Aave V3 LiquidationCall events; the emitter is checked against the official Aave V3 Pool for the chain.
• Builder: the block fee recipient (miner) and printable extraData; the builder→proposer payment is the last transaction sent by the fee recipient. Tips = (effectiveGasPrice − baseFee) × gasUsed; direct coinbase transfers inside contracts are not visible without traces.